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DE FACTO PARENTS AND THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF THE NEW ALl PRINCIPLES*
JULIE SHAPIRO**
In recent years, courts have faced repeatedly a question that
is simultaneously simple and difficult: "Who is a parent?" Many
cases and commentators have suggested ways to answer this
question. This Essay focuses on the approach of the American
Law Institute (ALI) in its recently released Principles.' The
question is of particular importance to parents in "non-
traditional" families Too often these parents have found the
law unsympathetic to their positions and insensitive to the needs
of their children. The ALI promises better treatment through
* PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS § 2 (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I, ALI, Mar. 20, 1998).
** Associate Professor, Seattle University School of Law.
1. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I, ALI, Mar. 20, 1998) [hereinafter PRIN-
CIPLES].
2. While the term is problematic, it is often used to identify families that diverge
from the supposedly "traditional" composition of legal mother, legal father, and chil-
dren. As discussed below, the "nontraditional" families of particular interest for pur-
poses of this Essay are stepfamilies and lesbian and gay families.
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legal recognition of "de facto parents."3 But in the end, the
ALI's promise is largely unfulfilled, as the definition of "de facto
parent" likely will exclude most nontraditional parents from the
benefits provided.
Before turning to particulars of the Principles, it is impor-
tant to place the question in context. In social and cultural
terms, it is usually easy to identify a child's parent or parents.
Parents are the adults responsible for rearing a child. Parents
get up in the night when the child cries. Parents, if they can, stay
home from work when the child is sick. Parents meet with the
teacher when a child is in trouble at school. Parents are always
there. They are the ones on whom the child, and we, as a soci-
ety, rely. Many of us realize that the people in question techni-
cally may be stepparents, adoptive parents, surrogate parents, or
foster parents. Additionally, the social and cultural definition of
"parent" establishes an ideal that few can live up to at all times.
Nevertheless, socially and culturally, it is rarely difficult to tell
• , 4
who a child's parents are. As with so many things in this world,
we usually know a parent when we see one, even if we cannot ar-
ticulate a precise working definition.5
So it is that most people can readily identify the parents of
the children with whom their children play, based on those per-
sons' actual relationships to the child in question. How many of
these "parents" are recognized as such by the law? Probably
most of them, but surely not all of them.
The problem, of course, is that the law relies on narrow and
specific definitions in order to categorize people precisely.
These legal categorizations are of critical importance in real life.
The law utilizes dualistic categories, such as "parent" versus
"nonparent"-which, in law, may be the same as "stranger"-to
identify those who hold legally recognized and enforceable rights
3. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 203(1)(b). While legal recognition for a de
facto parent may appear to be an oxymoron, it is not. "De facto" is the opposite of "de
jure" and is often understood to mean "in fact," as opposed to "in law." What the AL
draft provides, then, is legal recognition for a person who is a parent in fact, but not a
parent in the eyes of the law.
4. There are instances in which it may be difficult to identify, even in social and
cultural terms, a child's parents. For many people, surrogacy presents such a case. Is
the child's mother the woman who gave birth to a child or the woman who contracted
with someone else to do so?
5. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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or obligations and to separate them from those who have no
rights or obligations.'
Traditionally, the law has recognized only "natural par-
ents"7 and "adoptive parents"' as legal parents. Many other
adults who are presently raising children-that is, many other
"parents" in the common usage of the term-are not legally rec-
ognized as parents. They may take their children to school or to
after-school sports, comfort their children when they are hurt or
sick, attend doctor appointments and parent/teacher confer-
ences, supervise homework, prepare and share food, and oversee
discipline. Nevertheless, in the eyes of the law they are not par-
ents. Consequently, they fall within a category typically assigned
neither obligations nor rights." While the law sometimes calls
6. See Katherine Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Statute: The
Need for Legal Alternatives When the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879
(1984). See also Ruthann Robson, Third Parties and the Third Sex: Child Custody and
Lesbian Legal Theory, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1377 (1994).
7. The choice of the term "natural" is obviously problematic. Perhaps it once
seemed clear and simple. The woman who gave birth to a child was "naturally" the
mother of the child, and the law simply recognized what nature had decreed. The man
who impregnated the woman was the natural father of the child, unless, of course, the
woman was married to another man who might be conclusively presumed to be the fa-
ther of the child without regard to biological connection. Although it might be difficult
to identify the specific individual who was the natural father in a particular case, it was
not difficult to describe the acts that lead to the recognition of parenthood. Further,
every child must have two "natural" parents, one male and one female.
Modern reproductive technology and practice, including various forms of surro-
gacy and assisted insemination, have complicated matters. The "natural" father now
might be the husband of the woman who is inseminated with another man's sperm.
And the "natural" mother might be the woman who donates genetic material, or it
might be the woman who gave birth to the child (although she has no genetic link), or it
might be neither of those two women and instead is the woman who contracted for the
services of the first two women. Or perhaps it is two or even all three of these women.
While not discussed here, the concept of parenthood has become complicated.
8. Adoptive parents are necessarily legal parents because they are essentially
nonnatural parents who have completed whatever legal procedures are required to
grant them recognition as legal parents.
9. Legal recognition as a parent brings with it both substantial obligations, such as
the obligation to provide support, and significant rights, including the right to make
decisions about the manner in which the child is raised.
10. In some instances, they are described as "strangers," which is surely a triumph
of form over substance and of considerable cost to the individuals at issue. See John
DeWitt Gregory, Blood Ties: A Rationale for Child Visitation by Legal Strangers, 55
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 351 (1998).
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individuals in the nonparent category "strangers"" or "legal
strangers, 1 2 this Essay uses "nonlegal parents" to refer to those
social and cultural parents who are not legal parents.
13
While the range of nonlegal parents is broad,14 this Essay fo-
cuses on stegparents and lesbian and gay parents who are nonle-
gal parents. Whatever their social roles as "parents," they are
not generally recognized as parents in the eyes of the law. This
lack of legal recognition can create serious problems for these
parents and for their children.
Nonlegal stepparents and lesbian and gay nonlegal parents
generally share a common dilemma. They are involved in rais-
ing a child with another adult who is the child's legal parent. A
stepparent, by definition, is raising a child who is the legally rec-
ognized child of his or her spouse. 6 Similarly, lesbian and gay
nonlegal parents are generally raising children who are the legal
children, by virtue of birth or of adoption, of their lesbian and
gay partners. In other words, nonlegal stepparents and lesbian
and gay nonlegal parents are typically part of two-parent fami-
lies that consist of one legal parent and one nonlegal parent.
In this regard, the situations of stepparents and lesbian and
gay nonlegal parents are similar; however, important differences
exist. In particular, stepparents usually are involved in raising a
child who is a part of two separate households-that of the legal
mother and that of the legal father-and who has at least three
parents: legal mother, legal father, and stepparent. With step-
parents, there is almost inevitably a third parent: the legal parent
who is not the stepparent's spouse. In contrast, lesbian and gay
nonlegal parents often raise children who are part of only one
two-parent family. This Essay discusses the importance of this
11. See, e.g., Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991).
12. See Gregory, supra note 10.
13. See Julie Shapiro, A Lesbian-Centered Critique of Second Parent Adoptions, 14
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 17 n.27; see also Robson, supra note 6, at 1391-92.
. 14. Foster parents and surrogate parents may also be nonlegal parents, but their
concerns are not the focus of this Essay.
15. Some stepparents have completed adoptions, in which case they become legal
parents. Many lesbian and gay parents are biological parents and many others are
adoptive parents. In either case, they are legal parents. Stepparents who have not
completed adoptions and lesbian and gay parents not related to their children by birth
or adoption are the nonlegal parents on which this Essay centers.
16. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.015(4) (West 1999) (defining "stepparent" as
"the spouse of a biological or adoptive parent").
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difference later.
The absence of legally recognized parental status has dra-
matic consequences for nonlegal stepparents and nonlegal les-
bian and gay parents. Some are apparent during the day-to-day
lives of the families in which the nonlegal parents function. For
example, a nonlegal parent cannot effectively sign various con-
sent forms. However, the most significant consequences arise if
the relationship between the nonlegal and the legal parent ends.
If this occurs, and if the legal parent seeks to terminate the non-
legal parent's relationship with the child, the nonlegal parent
may be forced to resort to court. In court, the nonlegal parent is
at a tremendous disadvantage vis-a-vis the legal parent. In most
instances, the nonlegal parent will not even have standing to
seek custody unless he or she can show that the legal parent is an
unfit custodian. It is often difficult for a nonlegal parent to ob-
tain visitation rights. 8
The problem of the nonlegal parent's legal status has arisen
with increasing frequency over the last twenty years. 19 For the
most part, courts have been unwilling to expand the category of
"parent" beyond those recognized as legal parents by virtue of a
biological relationship with the child or through legal adoption
of the child.20 This unwillingness has lead to decisions that have
been widely criticized as failing to recognize the best interests of
the particular children or the complexities of modern life.2 The
problem is a difficult one.
To justify a narrow and limited definition of "parent,"
courts and commentators have repeatedly invoked the doctrine
of family privacy and the associated freedom of parents to raise
17. This is a difficult showing. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 2.04 Reporter's
Note to cmt. d at 61; see also Bartlett, supra note 6, at 1389.
18. See generally Gregory, supra note 10.
19. The problem has arisen in a variety of situations. It occurs when stepparents
or lesbian or gay co-parents contest custody of a child. Generally speaking, those rec-
ognized as parents have superior rights and can readily defeat custody or visitation
claims made by those who do not share the status of legal parent. In addition, surro-
gacy cases present this issue, forcing courts to decide who is the mother of a child
borne by one woman but genetically related to another. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert,
851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
20. See id.
21. See, e.g., Nancy Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers, 78 GEO. L.J. 459
(1990); Paula Ettelbrook, Who Is a Parent?, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 513 (1993);
Bartlett, supra note 6. But see Gregory, supra note 10.
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their children as they see fit. Courts often cite landmark Su-
preme Court cases that recognize rights of parental autonomy
and family privacy, such as Meyer v. Nebraska2 and Pierce v. So-
ciety of Sisters, in support of severely limiting the number and
qualifications of those who can claim parental rights.
The habitual reliance on established and deeply embedded
doctrines such as family privacy and parental autonomy make
legal change difficult. And there are strong policy arguments in
favor of retaining a narrow legal definition of a parent.23 In or-
der to ensure a reasonable measure of parental autonomy in
child-rearing decisions, the number of people who can legally
contest parental decisionmaking must be limited. Thus, even
commentators who have advanced broader definitions of
"parent" seek to maintain limits on who can enter the category.26
It is against this background that the drafters of the Princi-
ples have acted. Perhaps not surprisingly, they have chosen a
middle ground that expands the definition of parent but still em-
ploys a sharp limitation.27 Because the Principles have not been
adopted as law in any jurisdiction, one can only speculate about
its actual function. But a review of the critical provisions relat-
ing to nonlegal parents suggests that the ALI's improvements
are largely illusory. In practice, and perhaps by design, very few
nonlegal parents will benefit from the expanded definition.
Thus, the Principles in the end do little to address the dilemma
of nonlegal parents.
Three related provisions of the Principles govern the rights
of nonlegal parents. First, and most crucially, section 2.03 of the
Principles creates a special sub-category of parent-the "de
facto parent. " ' The Principles state, "unless otherwise specified,
22. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
23. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
24. For a discussion of the Court's response, see sources cited note supra 21.
25. Traxel v. Granville is currently pending before the U.S. Supreme Court. While
the facts of the case concern grandparent visitation, the statute at issue, Revised Code
of Washington (RCW) section 16.10.040, permits "any person" to seek visitation at
"any time." The Washington State Supreme Court held that this statute violates pa-
rental autonomy rights protected by the U.S. Constitution. In re Smith, 969 P.2d 21
(Wa. 1998).
26. See sources cited supra note 21.
27. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 2.03(1).
28. I1
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a parent is either a legal parent or a de facto parent."2 9 While
this Essay considers this specific definition shortly, it is critical to
note that de facto parents are necessarily nonlegal parents. And,
"unless otherwise specified," the Principles treat de facto-that
is, nonlegal-parents and legal parents identically. Thus, the
Principles recognize nonlegal parents as the legal equivalent of
legal parents, at least where it is not "otherwise specified."'
The second provision of importance to nonlegal parents is
section 2.09 of the Principles." This provision governs the allo-
cation of custodial responsibility for children when their parents
separate.32 In this section, the Principles adopt an approximation
scheme.33 The time the child spends with each parent after the
separation should approximate the amount of time that parent
spent caring for the child before the parents' separation.3 Nota-
bly, section 2.09 speaks of "parents" rather than "legal parents,"
which allows de facto parents as well as legal parents to share in
post-separation custody of a child. Because section 2.09 does not
specify differential treatment for legal parents and de facto par-
ents, and because it speaks only of "parents," it envisions a
scheme in which legal and de facto parents will be treated identi-
cally under the law.
Section 2.21 of the Principles, however, largely undercuts
the equality of treatment promised by section 2.09.3" This provi-
sion explicitly addresses "allocation of responsibility to persons
other than legal parents" and limits the circumstances under
which de facto parents can benefit from their inclusion in section
29. Id. § 2.03(1).
30. See, e.g., id. § 2.10 (addressing the allocation of decisionmaking responsibility
and presuming joint decisionmaking authority for legal parents as well as granting ac-
cess to children's records to legal, but not de facto, parents).
31. Id. § 2.09.
32. The Principles eschew the use of the terms "custody" and "visitation," speak-
ing instead of "allocation of custodial responsibility" and "allocation of decisionmaking
authority." See PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 2.09(1).
33. The first to advocate an approximate scheme was Elizabeth Scott. Elizabeth
Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preferences, and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L. REV. 615 (1992).
34. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 2.09(1).
35. By contrast, section 2.10 of the Principles, which governs allocation of deci-
sionmaking responsibility, incorporates provisions that favor legal parents over nonle-
gal parents. See id § 2.10(2) (presumption in favor of joint decisionmaking for legal
parents but not for de facto parents).
36. Id. § 2.21.
1999]
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2.09. This Essay returns to the provisions of section 2.21 later.
Despite the limitations of section 2.21, the ALI scheme ap-
pears to be a major advance for nonlegal parents. To the extent
that nonlegal parents are de facto parents, the Principles offer
them recognition and standing to claim a continuing relationship
with their child. It also provides them a measure of formal, if
not real, equality.
A close examination of the definition of "de facto parent"
contained in section 2.03 reveals, however, that very few nonle-
gal parents will be able to take advantage of the apparently gen-
erous scope of section 2.092 7 The narrow definition in section
2.03 leaves the ALI's promise for nonlegal parents largely unful-
filled.
Section 2.03-The Definition of De Facto Parent
The key to understanding the ALI's treatment of nonlegal
parents lies in the analysis of section 2.03(1) of the Principles.
This section sets forth a definition of parent that includes both
legal and nonlegal parents. 8 Subsequent provisions grant "par-
ents," as defined in section 2.03(1), legal rights. Paradoxically,
37. This is not an unintended consequence. The drafters of the ALI, concerned
about issues of parental autonomy, deliberately drafted a narrow definition of de facto
parent in order to limit the number of individuals who could qualify for consideration
under section 2.09 of the Principles. See id. § 2.03(1).
38. That section states:
(1) Unless otherwise specified, a parent is either a legal parent or a de facto
parent.
(a) A legal parent is an individual defined as a parent under other state
law, on the basis of biological relationship, presumed biological relation-
ship, legal adoption, or other recognized grounds.
(b) A de facto parent is an adult, not the child's legal parent, who for a
period that is significant in light of the child's age, developmental level,
and other circumstances
(i) has resided with the child, and
(ii) for reasons primarily other than financial compensation, and
with the consent of a legal parent to the formation of a de facto
parent relationship or as a result of a complete failure or inability of
any legal parent to perform caretaking functions, regularly has per-
formed
(i) a majority of the caretaking functions for the child, or
(ii) a share of caretaking functions at least as great as that of
the parent with whom the child primarily has lived.
PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 2.03(1).
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the ALI draft gives some nonlegal parents legally recognized pa-
rental rights and obligations, even though it does not make them
legal parents.
The nonlegal parents who can take advantage of the provi-
sions of the Principles are those who can satisfy the definition of
de facto parents. According to section 2.03(1)(b) of the Princi-
ples, which sets forth the definition, a de facto parent must (1) be
a nonlegal parent (2) "who for a period of time that is signifi-
cant, given the child's age, developmental level, and other cir-
cumstances," (3) "has resided with the child for reasons primar-
ily other than... compensation," (4) and who, "with the consent
of a legal parent," (5) "regularly has performed... a majority of
the caretaking functions for the child, or ... a share of the care-
taking functions at least as great as that of the parent with whom
the child primarily has lived.,
39
The first four qualifications do little to exclude most nonle-
gal parents from the category of de facto parents. Most nonlegal
parents in the categories on which this Essay focuses have played
their role in a child's life for a significant period of time, have
lived with the child, have acted for reasons other than financial
compensation, and have acted with the consent of a legal parent.
If they did not meet these criteria, we would not consider them
"parents" in a social/cultural sense. The difficulty lies in the fi-
nal requirement. An understanding of this difficulty requires an
even closer examination of the definitional provisions.
Raising a child is, of course, an infinitely complex task that
requires performance of a wide range of functions. These func-
tions range from paying the mortgage or rent, to grocery shop-
ping, laundry, and house cleaning, to stroking a tired child's hair.
The Principles label the range of required tasks "parenting func-
tions."' Parenting functions are "tasks that serve the needs of
39. Id. § 2.03(1)(b).
40. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 2.03(7). That section states:
(7) Parenting functions are tasks that serve the needs of the child or the
child's residential family. Parenting functions include caretaking functions,
as defined in Paragraph (6). Parenting functions also include functions that
are not caretaking functions under Paragraph (6), including
(a) provision of economic support
(b) participation in decisionmaking regarding the child's welfare;
(c) maintenance or improvement of the family residence, home or furni-
ture repair, home-improvement projects, yard work, and house cleaning;
19991
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the child., 41
The Principles identify a critical sub-category of tasks
among parenting functions that are called "caretaking func-
tions." "Caretaking functions" are "tasks which involve interac-
tion with the child or direct the interaction or care provided by
another." 42 These include feeding, bedtime and wake-up rou-
tines, discipline, arrangements for the child's education, etc.43
Notably, some parenting functions, such as provision of eco-
nomic support, maintenance and improvement of the home, and
financial planning, are not caretaking functions."
The distinction between caretaking functions and parenting
functions is critical because de facto parenthood is determinined
(d) financial planning and organization, care repair and maintenance,
food and clothing purchasing, cleaning and maintenance of clothing, and
other tasks supporting the consumption and savings needs of the family;
and
(e) other functions usually performed by a parent or guardian that are
important to the child's welfare and development.
Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. According to the definition, caretaking functions include
(a) feeding, bedtime and wake-up routines, care of the child when sick or
hurt, bathing, grooming, personal hygiene, dressing, recreation and play,
physical safety, transportation, and other functions that meet the daily physi-
cal needs of the child;
(b) direction of the child's various developmental needs, including the acqui-
sition of motor and language skills, toilet training, self-confidence, and matu-
ration;
(c) discipline, instruction in manners, assignment and supervision of chores,
and other tasks that attend to the child's needs for behavioral control and
self-restraint;
(d) arrangements for the child's education, including remedial or special
services appropriate to the child's needs and interests, communication with
teachers and counselors, and supervision of homework;
(e) the developmental and maintenance of appropriate interpersonal rela-
tionships with peers, siblings, and adults;
(f) arrangements for health care, including making appointments, communi-
cation with health-care providers, medical follow-up, and home health care;
(g) moral guidance; and
(h) arrangement of alternative care by a family member, baby-sitter, or other
child-care provider or facility, including investigation of alternatives, com-
munication with providers, and supervision.
Id.
43. See id.
44. See generally id. (providing no such inclusion in the definition of "caretaking
functions.").
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by the performance of caretaking rather than parenting func-
tions. In order to be a de facto parent, a person must perform a
share of the caretaking functions at least as great45 as those per-
formed by the parent with whom the child has primarily lived.4
This requirement will systematically and dramatically dis-
advantage many nonlegal parents. Egalitarian ideology notwith-
standing, many households, especially those with children, still
divide labor between a primary breadwinner and a primary
homemaker.47 For couples who employ this arrangement, the
primary breadwinner will be unable to claim de facto parent-
hood. Although the overall work of running a household may be
divided equally and the breadwinner may do an equal, or even
greater, share of the parenting functions as well as a substantial
portion of the caretaking tasks, she or he will not have per-
formed a share of the caretaking functions at least as great as the
primary homemaker. Thus, she or he will not qualify as a de
facto parent and will not benefit from the section allocating cus-
todial responsibility.4
The consequences that follow in the event of separation will
be dramatic. It is not simply that she or he will be allotted less
time with the child. The child's time, post-separation, is to be
divided between parents. As used in the Principles, this means
legal parents and de facto parents. If the breadwinner is not a
legal parent and does not qualify as a de facto parent, then she
45. Id. § 2.03(1)(b)(ii)(ii). Interestingly, the commentary to this provision states
that "to be a de facto parent, the adult must have performed a substantial share of the
caretaking functions for the child." Id. § 2.03 cmt. b(v) at 46 (emphasis added). As
discussed below, there is a crucial difference between the standard presented in the
model provisions and the standard presented in the commentary.
46. Section 2.03(1)(b)(ii) of the Principles specifies two routes to de facto parent-
hood. A person may perform either the majority of the caretaking functions, §
2.03(1)(b)(ii)(i), or a share at least as great as the parent with whom the child has pri-
marily lived, § 2.03(1)(b)(ii)(ii). Any person who meets the standard set forth in (i)
necessarily meets the standard in (ii). Therefore, practically speaking, any person who
can satisfy (ii) will qualify as a de facto parent, and the discussion will be shaped ac-
cordingly.
47. The primary breadwinner may do a significant amount of household labor, and
the primary homemaker may engage in significant amounts of paid labor outside the
home. But powerful economic incentives lead many families to have one member be
the primary income earner and another be primarily responsible for the home. The
roles of parent and ideal worker are not easily merged. While "family friendly" em-
ployers may feature prominently in the media, they are hardly the rule.
48. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 2.09.
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or he is not a parent in the ALI's meaning and will not be enti-
tled to any share of custodial responsibility for the child. Indeed,
under section 2.04, the nonlegal parent who fails to meet the de
facto parent standard is not entitled to notice or to party status
and does not have standing to initiate an action seeking contact
with the child.49
Given the common gendered pattern of the division of labor
and childcare, the de facto parent definition has the potential to
exclude many, if not most, stepparents. While patterns may be
changing, it is still common for men to play the role of primary
breadwinner and women to play the role of primary caretaker.
A stepfather who is a primary wage-earner will not qualify as a
de facto parent because he will not perform a share of the care-
taking functions at least as great as that performed by his wife,
the child's legal mother. Thus, even if the child lives most of the
time in the mother's and stepfather's home, the stepfather will
fail the Principles' de facto parent test.f
A stepmother, even though she may care for the child the
majority of the time the child is in her home (which is also the
home of the legal father), may also fail to qualify as a de facto
parent. If the child resides a majority of the time in the home of
her or his legal mother, that mother may perform a greater share
of the caretaking functions than the stepmother does. In this
51case, the stepmother will fail the de facto parent test. This may
be so even though the stepmother may perform a share of the
caretaking function far greater than that of the father. While the
father, who may perform no caretaking functions at all, will re-
tain legal entitlement vis-a-vis the child, the stepmother will
have no such claim.
Lesbian and gay parents face similar concerns with regard
to the de facto parent definition. While lesbian and gay parents
do not employ a division of labor based on gender, they none-
theless may mirror the common breadwinner/homemaker form,
particularly in a family with children. The same economic pres-
sures that lead heterosexual couples to divide labor into those
two roles exert force on lesbian and gay couples. In cases where
the breadwinner is also the legal parent, this would not create
49. See id. § 2.04 ("Parties to an Action Under This Chapter").
50. See id. § 2.03(1)(b)(ii)(ii).
51. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 2.03(1)(b)(ii)(ii).
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any problems because the homemaker would qualify as a de
facto parent. In contrast, in families where the homemaker is
the legal parent, the breadwinner will be left without legal rec-
ognition by virtue of the majority share requirement. 2 If the
caretaker is the legal mother, she will be entitled to parental
leave to care for her child, while the other parent will not. If she
has given birth, she is able to nurse the child while the other
mother is not. And the same economic forces that support a di-
vision of labor in the first place support the choice of the person
producing less income as the person to become pregnant or
adopt a child. 3
While it may be appropriate to assign primary residential
responsibility to the parent who has spent the most amount of
time with a child and to allocate a child's time in the approxi-
mate proportion it has been spent in the past, that is not the is-
sue here. Rather, the question is whether a parent who performs
thirty percent of the caretaking functions and half of the par-
enting functions is entitled to participate in the proceedings re-
garding the child's future residence and to claim some continu-
ing time with the child. Had the ALI drafters chosen the
language of the commentary,4 this parent would have an enti-
tlement. Thirty percent most likely would constitute "a substan-
tial share" of the caretaking function. But under the "at least as
great a share" rule of the draft itself,55 the nonlegal parent who
does thirty, forty, or even forty-five percent of the caretaking
functions as well as a majority of the parenting functions may be
no more than a legal stranger.
The commentary to the Principles clarifies that this choice
was influenced by the enduring concerns about family auton-
omy. The drafters intended that very few people will be able to
claim de facto parent status.56 Yet this narrow approach robs the
52. Where one member of a lesbian couple gives birth to a child (thereby estab-
lishing legal parenthood), the same forces that might lead to a division of labor would
tend to lead to the homemaker role being assigned to the biological mother.
53. Of course, these are not the only factors. Other considerations will come into
play, including personal inclinations of the parties. Still, there may well be a greater
tendency for the legal mother to stay at home.
54. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 2.03 cmt. b(v).
55. Id § 2.03(1)(b)(ii)(ii).
56. See id § 2.03 cmt. b at 40 ("To avoid unnecessary and inappropriate intrusion
into the relationships between legal parents and their children, the definition of a de
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de facto parent provision of much of its apparent utility. Were
the language "a substantial share," would it allow neighbors and
childcare workers to rush to court to claim custody? Given the
other restrictions (that the care be provided for reasons other
than monetary incentive),57 this seems unlikely.
The remaining provision of importance to nonlegal parents
is section 2.21. This provision restricts allocation of responsibil-
ity under section 2.09 to a de facto parent and restricts the
court's ability to allocate primary custodial responsibility to a de
facto parent. It also permits a court to deny an allocation of re-
sponsibility to a de facto parent "if, in light of the number of
other adults to be allocated responsibility, the allocation would
be impractical."59
While these restrictions may be of limited practical impor-
tance, they undercut the promise of section 2.03 that de facto
parents are equal to legal parenfs. Instead, de facto parents are
parents until it is time to make some very difficult choices.6
When that happens, under the Principles, de facto parents will
inevitably lose out to those who can claim legal recognition of
parenthood.
In some important respects, the Principles are a step for-
ward for nonlegal parents. At the same time, this step, as are
perhaps most steps in the law, is a small step, one that will leave
many problems unresolved.
facto parent is a narrow one that few individuals who are not legal parents will be able
to satisfy.").
57. See id. § 2.03(1)(b)(ii).
58. PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 2.21(1)(a). That section states:
(a) [The court] should allocate primary custodial responsibility to a de facto
parent over the objection of a legal parent who is fit and willing to assume
primary custodial responsibility only if
(i) the legal parent has not been performing a reasonable share of par-
enting functions, as defined in § 2.03(7), or
(ii) the alternative would be harmful to the child ....
59. Id. § 2.21(1)(b).
60. Section 2.21 of the Principles also makes it clear that persons who are neither
legal parents nor de facto parents should not be allocated responsibility for a child un-
less they are grandparents and meet certain other qualifications. Thus, a nonlegal par-
ent who fails to qualify as a de facto parent should not be allocated responsibility. Id. §
2.21(2)(a).
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